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The	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  of	  global	  Internet	  governance	  has	  emerged	  as	  the	  dominant	  approach	  
to	  navigating	  the	  complex	  set	  of	  interests,	  agendas	  and	  implications	  of	  our	  increasing	  dependence	  
on	  this	  technology.	  Protecting	  this	  model	  of	  global	  governance	  in	  this	  context	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  
by	  the	  US	  and	  EU	  as	  ‘essential’	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Internet.	  Bringing	  together	  actors	  from	  the	  
private	  sector,	  the	  public	  sector	  and	  also	  civil	  society,	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  is	  not	  
only	  regarded	  by	  many	  as	  the	  best	  way	  to	  organise	  around	  this	  particular	  issue,	  it	  is	  also	  held	  up	  as	  a	  
potential	  template	  for	  the	  management	  of	  other	  ‘post-­‐state’	  issues.	  However,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  
its	  normative	  aspirations	  to	  representation	  and	  power	  sharing,	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  approach	  to	  
global	  Internet	  governance	  has	  received	  little	  critical	  attention.	  This	  paper	  examines	  the	  issues	  of	  
legitimacy	  and	  accountability	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  ‘rule-­‐makers’	  and	  ‘rule-­‐takers’	  in	  this	  model	  and	  
finds	  that	  it	  can	  also	  function	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  reinforcement	  of	  existing	  power	  dynamics.	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Introduction	  
The	  emergence	  of	  a	  global	  computer	  network	  and	  the	  intensification	  of	  our	  reliance	  upon	  it	  has	  
been	  the	  source	  of	  some	  fascinating	  political	  challenges	  over	  the	  past	  two	  and	  a	  half	  decades.	  The	  
Internet	  prompts	  debate	  about	  the	  relative	  merit	  of	  standards	  vs	  rules,	  of	  pluralism	  vs	  solidarism,	  of	  
security	  vs	  privacy.	  And	  perhaps	  most	  significantly,	  it	  prompts	  debate	  about	  the	  value	  of	  these	  (and	  
other)	  binaries	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  thinking	  creatively	  about	  how	  to	  approach	  large	  technological	  
shifts	  like	  the	  Information	  Age.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  key	  areas	  of	  debate	  has	  been	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  Internet.	  All	  computer	  networks	  
require	  some	  level	  of	  administration	  but	  the	  distributed	  nature	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  its	  deeply	  
political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  implications	  mean	  that	  coordination	  and	  negotiation	  in	  this	  context	  
is	  contentious	  and	  the	  site	  of	  considerable	  power	  struggles.	  Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  multi-­‐
stakeholderism	  has	  become	  almost	  synonymous	  with	  global	  Internet	  governance.	  In	  March	  2014,	  
Australian	  Communications	  Minister,	  Malcolm	  Turnbull	  issued	  a	  statement	  declaring	  that	  Australia	  
supported	  “an	  open	  Internet	  which	  is	  administered	  by	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  organisations	  like	  ICANN	  
and	  NOT	  [sic]	  by	  governments”	  in	  either	  a	  multi-­‐lateral	  or	  supra-­‐national	  form.1	  In	  June	  2014,	  Fadi	  
Chehadé,	  head	  of	  the	  Internet	  Corporation	  for	  Assigned	  Names	  and	  Numbers	  (ICANN)	  declared	  that	  
the	  50th	  ICANN	  meeting	  in	  London	  was	  a	  milestone	  meeting	  due	  to	  “the	  remarkable	  affirmations	  of	  
the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model”.2	  In	  a	  hearing	  on	  proposed	  Internet	  regulation,	  US	  Congressman	  Greg	  
Walden	  argued	  that	  “weakening	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  threatens	  the	  Internet,	  harming	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Malcolm	  Turnbull,	  ‘Australia	  is	  committed	  to	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  system	  of	  Internet	  governance’,	  press	  
release	  on	  Malcolm	  Turnbull	  MP	  website,	  March	  15,	  2014.	  
http://www.malcolmturnbull.com.au/media/australian-­‐committed-­‐to-­‐a-­‐multi-­‐stakeholder-­‐system-­‐of-­‐internet-­‐
governance.	  
2	  Fadi	  Chehadé,	  ‘Largest	  Ever	  ICANN	  Meeting	  Convenes	  in	  London	  Affirmation	  of	  Multistakeholder	  Model	  for	  
Internet	  Governance	  by	  World	  Leaders’,	  press	  release	  on	  ICANN	  website,	  June	  23,	  2014.	  
https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-­‐2014-­‐06-­‐23-­‐en	  .	  
ability	  to	  spread	  prosperity	  and	  freedom”.3	  Not	  only	  is	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  widely	  regarded	  
as	  the	  best	  approach	  to	  governance	  of	  the	  Internet,	  some	  also	  regard	  it	  as	  offering	  a	  model	  for	  the	  
renovation	  of	  global	  governance	  more	  generally.	  4	  	  
Somewhat	  surprisingly,	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  has	  not	  benefited	  from	  as	  much	  
critical	  analysis	  as	  its	  relative	  weight	  might	  suggest	  it	  would.5	  Discussed	  predominantly	  within	  the	  
Internet	  community,	  it	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  strong	  normative	  component	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  that	  in	  which	  
terms	  like	  ‘democracy	  promotion’	  and	  ‘Internet	  freedom’	  have.6	  That	  is,	  the	  attractive	  qualities	  
understood	  to	  be	  embedded	  within	  these	  concepts,	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  prophylactic	  to	  the	  
scrutiny	  that	  is	  so	  essential	  to	  thinking	  through	  emerging	  issues	  and	  challenges.	  	  In	  some	  ways,	  the	  
discursive	  power	  of	  these	  concepts	  is	  as	  significant	  and	  as	  interesting	  as	  the	  power	  that	  is	  generated	  
through	  the	  actual	  functions	  and	  practices	  they	  refer	  to.	  Padovani	  and	  Pavan	  suggest	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  
diversity	  in	  debates	  about	  Internet	  governance	  signal	  the	  potential	  for	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  to	  
become	  “a	  rhetorical	  exercise	  aimed	  at	  neutralising	  criticism”	  rather	  than	  a	  truly	  unique	  and	  
participatory	  mechanism	  for	  governing	  a	  global	  resource.7	  
This	  article	  offers	  one	  contribution	  to	  what	  should	  be	  a	  much	  broader	  analysis	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  
power	  dynamics	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance.	  The	  paper	  argues	  that	  contrary	  to	  one	  of	  
the	  key	  claims	  about	  it,	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  serves	  largely	  to	  reinforce	  existing	  
power	  relations	  rather	  than	  disrupt	  them.	  Specifically,	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  in	  Internet	  
governance	  privileges	  the	  interests	  of	  those	  actors	  that	  were	  instrumental	  in	  establishing	  it	  –	  the	  US	  
government	  and	  those	  whose	  interests	  align	  with	  a	  US	  agenda.	  Of	  the	  three	  ‘stakeholders’	  defined	  in	  
the	  literature,	  civil	  society	  remains	  relatively	  disempowered	  although	  it	  plays	  an	  important	  
legitimising	  role	  for	  the	  other	  stakeholders,	  the	  private	  sector	  is	  dominated	  by	  US	  multinationals	  
which	  serve	  in	  many	  ways	  to	  aggregate	  US	  power,	  and	  governments	  show	  no	  significant	  signs	  of	  
relinquishing	  their	  conventional	  hold	  on	  sovereign	  power.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Greg	  Walden,	  opening	  statement	  at	  the	  ‘International	  Proposals	  to	  Regulate	  the	  Internet’,	  hearing	  before	  the	  
Committee	  on	  Energy	  and	  Commerce,	  May	  31,	  2012,	  Washington,	  DC,	  p.2.	  
4	  Bertrand	  de	  la	  Chapelle,	  ‘Towards	  Multi-­‐Stakeholder	  Governance	  –	  The	  Internet	  Governance	  Forum	  as	  
Laboratory’,	  Internet	  Governance:	  Infrastructure	  and	  Institutions,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  
pp.256-­‐270.	  
5	  Some	  notable	  contributions	  include	  Jean-­‐Marie	  Chenou,	  ‘Is	  Internet	  Governance	  a	  Democratic	  Process?:	  
Multistakeholderism	  and	  transnational	  elites’,	  paper	  presented	  at	  the	  ECPR	  Conference,	  2011;	  Dan	  Drezner,	  
‘The	  Global	  Governance	  of	  the	  Internet:	  Bringing	  the	  State	  Back	  In’,	  Political	  Science	  Quarterly,	  Vol.119,	  No.3,	  
2004;	  Bart	  Cammaerts,	  ‘Power	  Dynamics	  in	  Multi-­‐stakeholder	  Policy	  Processes	  and	  Intra-­‐civil	  Society	  
Networking’,	  in	  Robin	  Mansell	  and	  Mark	  Raboy	  (eds.),	  The	  Handbook	  of	  Global	  Media	  and	  Communication	  
Policy,	  (Oxford:	  Wiley	  Blackwell,	  2011),	  Laura	  DeNardis	  and	  Mark	  Raymond,	  ‘Thinking	  Clearly	  about	  
Multistakeholder	  Internet	  Governance’,	  paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Eighth	  Annual	  GigaNet	  Symposium,	  Bali	  
Indonesia,	  October	  21,	  2013;	  Laura	  DeNardis,	  The	  Global	  War	  for	  Internet	  Governance,	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  
University	  Press,	  2014);	  Milton	  Mueller	  and	  Ben	  Wagner,	  ‘Finding	  a	  Formula	  for	  Brazil:	  Representation	  and	  
Legitimacy	  in	  Internet	  Governance’,	  Center	  for	  Global	  Communication	  Studies,	  Annenberg	  School	  for	  
Communication,	  http://www.global.asc.upenn.edu/fileLibrary/PDFs/MiltonBenWPdraft_Final.pdf.	  	  
6	  On	  democracy	  promotion,	  see	  Jeff	  Bridoux	  and	  Milja	  Kurki,	  Democracy	  Promotion:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction,	  
(New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2014).	  On	  Internet	  Freedom	  see	  Madeline	  Carr,	  ‘Internet	  Freedom,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  
Power’,	  Australian	  Journal	  of	  International	  Affairs,	  Vol.67,	  No.5,	  2013.	  
7	  Claudia	  Padovani	  and	  Elena	  Pavan,	  ‘Diversity	  Reconsidered	  in	  a	  Global	  Multi-­‐Stakeholder	  Environment:	  
Insights	  from	  the	  Online	  World’,	  in	  The	  Power	  of	  Ideas:	  Internet	  Governance	  in	  a	  Global	  Multi-­‐Stakeholder	  
Environment,	  Wolfgang	  Kleinwachter	  (ed.),	  (Marketing	  for	  Deutschland	  GmbH,	  2007),	  p.100.	  
This	  analysis	  is	  situated	  within	  a	  Gramscian	  approach	  to	  hegemonic	  power	  that	  focuses	  on	  
controlling	  narratives,	  setting	  the	  agenda	  and	  defining	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  in	  order	  to	  minimise	  
(or	  delegitimise)	  dissent.	  Gramsci’s	  ideas	  about	  power	  are	  important	  here	  because	  they	  are	  based	  
on	  what	  Marianne	  Franklin	  has	  termed	  “manufacturing	  consensus”	  rather	  than	  coercion.	  8	  ‘Rule	  
makers’	  and	  ‘rule	  takers’	  in	  global	  Internet	  governance	  are	  bound	  together	  by	  a	  shared	  
understanding	  of	  a	  particular	  political	  ideology	  and	  set	  of	  normative	  claims	  about	  what	  the	  Internet	  
‘should’	  be.	  By	  promoting	  a	  certain	  governance	  model	  as	  most	  compatible	  with	  widely	  resonant	  
norms	  like	  ‘freedom’,	  ‘privacy’,	  ‘democracy’,	  ‘equality’	  and	  ‘political	  self-­‐determination’,	  opposition	  
to	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  becomes	  synonymous	  with	  opposition	  to	  those	  norms	  and	  leaves	  little	  room	  
for	  alternative	  views.	  
In	  exploring	  the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  this	  article	  widens	  the	  
lens	  that	  is	  generally	  applied	  to	  this	  issue.	  Although	  there	  is	  quite	  a	  lot	  of	  literature	  on	  multi-­‐
stakeholder	  Internet	  governance,	  much	  of	  it	  focuses	  on	  a	  set	  of	  events,	  meetings	  and	  agreements	  
like	  the	  World	  Summit	  on	  the	  Information	  Society	  (WSIS)	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  2000s	  that	  led	  to	  
the	  emergence	  and	  establishment	  of	  this	  particular	  conception	  of	  how	  the	  Internet	  should	  be	  
governed.9	  Rather	  than	  focus	  on	  these	  specific	  events,	  this	  paper	  situates	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  
governance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  broader	  work	  on	  global	  governance	  and	  in	  a	  political	  context	  based	  on	  
the	  dominance	  of	  liberalism	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  connects	  multi-­‐
stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  to	  some	  broader	  power	  dynamics	  that	  demonstrate	  more	  
continuity	  than	  change	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘rule-­‐makers’	  and	  ‘rule-­‐takers’.	  	  
Internet	  governance	  is	  mired	  in	  politics,	  interests,	  and	  contested	  legitimacy.	  This	  is	  not,	  as	  some	  
might	  argue,	  because	  governments	  have	  undue	  involvement.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  because	  the	  Internet	  is	  a	  
mechanism	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  power	  –	  soft	  power	  through	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  dominance,	  hard	  
power	  through	  cyber	  attacks	  like	  Stuxnet,	  intelligence	  gathering	  and	  commercial	  gain	  and	  (the	  focus	  
of	  this	  argument)	  a	  Gramscian	  conception	  of	  hegemonic	  power	  through	  the	  ability	  of	  those	  
dominant	  actors	  to	  set	  the	  agenda	  and	  the	  parameters	  within	  which	  global	  Internet	  governance	  can	  
be	  considered	  and	  developed.	  The	  more	  we	  understand	  about	  the	  opportunities	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  
governance	  models	  for	  the	  Internet	  (or	  anything	  else)	  the	  better	  equipped	  we	  are	  to	  effectively	  
refine	  and	  amend	  those	  practices,	  functions	  and	  roles	  that	  comprise	  it.	  Thomas	  Weiss	  and	  Rorden	  
Wilkinson	  argue	  that	  a	  central	  preoccupation	  of	  investigations	  into	  global	  governance	  more	  broadly	  
should	  be	  “the	  myriad	  ways	  that	  power	  is	  exercised	  within	  such	  a	  system,	  how	  interests	  are	  
articulated	  and	  pursued,	  the	  kind	  of	  ideas	  and	  discourses	  from	  which	  power	  and	  interests	  draw	  
substance	  as	  well	  as	  which	  help	  establish,	  maintain,	  and	  perpetuate	  the	  system.”10	  This	  is	  precisely	  
what	  this	  article	  provides	  in	  the	  context	  of	  global	  Internet	  governance.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Marianne	  Franklin,	  Digital	  Dilemmas:	  Power,	  Resistance	  and	  the	  Internet,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2013),	  p.157.	  
9	  World	  Summit	  on	  the	  Information	  Society,	  http://www.itu.int/wsis/index.html	  	  
10	  Thomas	  Weiss	  and	  Rorden	  Wilkinson,	  ‘Rethinking	  Global	  Governance?	  Complexity,	  Authority,	  Power,	  
Change’,	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  Vol.58,	  2014,	  p.207.	  
Global	  Governance…	  of	  the	  Internet	  	  
Weiss	  and	  Wilkinson	  have	  described	  contemporary	  global	  governance	  as	  “a	  halfway	  house	  between	  
the	  international	  anarchy	  underlying	  realist	  analysis	  and	  a	  world	  state.”	  11	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  serious	  
disputes	  resulting	  from	  incidents	  like	  Wikileaks,	  the	  Prism	  program	  and	  allegations	  of	  Chinese	  cyber	  
espionage,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  overlook	  the	  extraordinary	  success	  of	  global	  Internet	  governance	  in	  this	  
‘halfway	  house’.	  A	  few	  decades	  ago,	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  world	  would	  be	  connected	  through	  a	  global	  
computer	  network	  –	  with	  all	  of	  the	  commercial,	  legal	  and	  political	  implications	  that	  it	  poses	  would	  
have	  been	  all	  but	  inconceivable.	  Despite	  continuing	  challenges,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Internet	  works	  on	  a	  
functional	  level	  so	  very	  consistently	  is	  a	  significant	  triumph	  of	  global	  collaboration	  over	  
competition.12	  However,	  tensions	  over	  the	  global	  governance	  of	  the	  Internet	  are	  intensifying	  as	  
actors	  have	  come	  to	  recognise	  the	  power	  associated	  with	  it	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  take	  a	  step	  
back	  from	  the	  particular	  and	  consider	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  context	  of	  global	  governance	  more	  
broadly.	  Internet	  governance	  does	  have	  some	  distinctive	  features	  but	  it	  is	  a	  subset	  of	  challenges	  
defined	  by	  shifts	  in	  “the	  character	  of	  global	  problems,	  the	  nature	  of	  actors,	  and	  the	  perceived	  
limitations	  of	  international	  measures	  to	  govern	  the	  planet.”13	  
Andrew	  Hurrell’s	  work	  on	  global	  order	  in	  international	  society	  identifies	  three	  primary	  challenges	  
that	  he	  argues	  have	  prompted	  us	  to	  rethink	  existing	  Westphalian	  based	  governance	  arrangements;	  
the	  need	  to	  capture	  shared	  and	  common	  interests,	  the	  need	  to	  manage	  unequal	  power,	  and	  the	  
necessity	  of	  mediating	  cultural	  diversity	  and	  value	  conflict.14	  This	  articulation	  of	  these	  challenges	  
incorporates	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  material	  and	  ideational	  factors	  that	  apply	  to	  global	  Internet	  
governance	  and	  make	  it	  so	  difficult	  to	  harmonise	  across	  legal,	  cultural	  and	  political	  boundaries.	  In	  
Hurrell’s	  view,	  “it	  is	  the	  difficulty	  of	  finding	  a	  legitimate	  form	  of	  global	  politics	  capable	  of	  meeting	  
these	  three	  challenges	  together	  which	  makes	  the	  problem	  of	  order	  a	  quintessentially	  political	  
problem.”	  15	  However,	  very	  often	  in	  debates	  about	  global	  Internet	  governance,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  
technical	  coordination	  which	  is	  much	  easier	  to	  agree	  upon.	  This	  is	  obviously	  a	  significant	  element	  of	  
Internet	  governance	  but	  very	  often,	  technical	  decisions	  and	  standards	  have	  political	  implications	  
that	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	  be	  ignored.	  Framing	  Internet	  governance	  as	  ‘technical’	  provides	  a	  
discursive	  mechanism	  for	  inoculating	  the	  issues	  from	  important	  and	  inescapable	  political	  debates.	  
For	  those	  who	  do	  acknowledge	  that	  Internet	  governance	  goes	  beyond	  the	  technical,	  the	  question	  of	  
an	  appropriate	  model	  of	  governance	  arises.	  The	  two	  alternatives	  to	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  that	  are	  
most	  widely	  discussed	  are	  multi-­‐lateral	  governance	  -­‐	  very	  much	  in	  the	  pre-­‐globalisation,	  
Westphalian	  approach	  to	  international	  politics,	  and	  supra-­‐national	  governance	  through	  a	  body	  like	  
the	  United	  Nations	  International	  Telecommunications	  Union	  (ITU).	  Kahler	  and	  Lake	  argue	  that	  issues	  
that	  require	  coordination	  rather	  than	  collaboration	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  seen	  by	  states	  as	  suitable	  
for	  networked,16	  non-­‐hierarchical	  governance	  arrangements	  but	  where	  interests	  diverge	  too	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Thomas	  Weiss	  and	  Rorden	  Wilkinson,	  ‘Rethinking	  Global	  Governance?’,	  p.213.	  
12	  Of	  course,	  interpretations	  of	  what	  it	  means	  for	  the	  Internet	  to	  ‘work’	  are	  subjective	  and	  this	  in	  itself	  is	  a	  
question	  that	  should	  be	  opened	  up	  for	  debate.	  In	  this	  context	  though,	  I	  refer	  simply	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  packets	  of	  
information	  move	  across	  the	  network	  more	  or	  less	  as	  they	  are	  intended	  to.	  
13	  Thomas	  Weiss	  and	  Rorden	  Wilkinson,	  ‘Rethinking	  Global	  Governance?’,	  p.209.	  
14	  Andrew	  Hurrell,	  On	  Global	  Order,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.2.	  
15	  Ibid.	  
16	  In	  global	  governance,	  networked	  arrangements	  are	  characterised	  by	  ‘sharing	  authority	  between	  the	  nodes	  
or	  constituting	  authority	  from	  the	  interactions	  themselves’.	  Miles	  Kahler	  and	  David	  Lake,	  ‘Economic	  
significantly,	  either	  supra-­‐national	  or	  hierarchical	  arrangements	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  emerge.17	  
Significantly,	  in	  discussing	  political	  explanations	  for	  choices	  of	  various	  governance	  models,	  Kahler	  
and	  Lake	  also	  make	  the	  point	  that	  “actors	  have	  no	  intrinsic	  preference	  for	  one	  or	  another	  
governance	  structure,	  but	  struggle	  to	  influence	  the	  choice	  of	  structure	  so	  as	  to	  maximize	  their	  
political	  aims”.	  18	  	  They	  would	  argue	  then,	  that	  actors	  prefer	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  of	  global	  
Internet	  governance	  not	  primarily	  for	  normative	  reasons	  (though	  not	  necessary	  excluding	  those	  
altogether)	  but	  because	  they	  regard	  that	  model	  as	  most	  likely	  to	  promote	  their	  own	  interests	  –	  
however	  those	  may	  be	  defined.	  In	  their	  view	  “the	  conflict	  over	  governance	  is	  largely	  a	  conflict	  over	  
policy,	  once	  removed”.	  19	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  following	  section	  details	  the	  power	  expectations	  of	  
the	  US	  government	  during	  a	  critical	  period	  in	  the	  development	  of	  existing	  arrangements.	  
Internet	  Governance	  and	  US	  National	  Interest	  
As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  the	  governance	  of	  other	  large	  scale	  systems	  like	  the	  environment	  or	  global	  
finance,	  Internet	  governance	  is	  not	  a	  single,	  unitary	  function	  or	  practice.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  a	  complex	  
matrix	  of	  technical	  standard	  setting,	  resource	  allocation,	  legal	  arrangements	  and	  the	  control	  of	  
access	  and	  information	  online.	  In	  part	  due	  to	  this	  complex	  array	  of	  functions	  and	  practices,	  the	  
actors	  involved	  are	  also	  diverse	  and	  include	  governments,	  supra-­‐national	  bodies	  like	  the	  
International	  Telecommunications	  Union	  (ITU),	  the	  private	  sector	  owners	  and	  operators	  of	  services,	  
platforms	  and	  infrastructure,	  an	  array	  of	  technical	  and	  standard	  setting	  bodies,	  and	  civil	  society	  
groups	  like	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  and	  advocacy	  groups.	  20	  	  A	  complete	  history	  of	  this	  is	  
beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  this	  paper	  but	  some	  of	  the	  key	  political	  factors	  are	  outlined	  below.	  
The	  1980s	  had	  seen	  a	  shift	  in	  Western	  thinking	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  people,	  their	  
governments	  and	  the	  private	  sector.	  Both	  the	  Reagan	  and	  Thatcher	  governments	  emphasised	  ‘small	  
government’,	  the	  privatisation	  of	  public	  infrastructure	  and	  faith	  in	  market	  forces	  to	  deliver	  on	  what	  
was	  ‘best’	  for	  society.21	  Bill	  Clinton’s	  initial	  presidential	  campaign	  in	  1992	  was	  run	  on	  the	  slogan	  ‘It’s	  
the	  economy,	  stupid’,	  and	  his	  platform	  was	  very	  much	  about	  supporting	  the	  private	  sector	  
expansion	  globally	  in	  order	  to	  shore	  up	  American	  power.22	  The	  Cold	  War	  was	  over	  and	  the	  US	  had	  
emerged	  triumphant.	  The	  Clinton	  administration’s	  strategy	  (with	  Al	  Gore	  as	  Vice	  President)	  was	  to	  
focus	  on	  new	  technology	  rather	  than	  conventional	  military	  technology.	  They	  proposed	  spending	  the	  
‘peace	  dividend’	  –	  that	  money	  no	  longer	  required	  for	  maintaining	  equilibrium	  with	  the	  USSR	  -­‐	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Integration	  and	  Global	  Governance:	  Why	  So	  Little	  Supranationalism?’	  in	  The	  Politics	  of	  Global	  Regulation,	  
Walter	  Mattli	  and	  Ngaire	  Woods	  (eds.),	  (Princeton,	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  p.248.	  
17	  Miles	  Kahler	  and	  David	  Lake,	  ‘Economic	  Integration	  and	  Global	  Governance’,	  p.254.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  p.253.	  
19	  Ibid.	  
20	  Laura	  DeNardis	  and	  Mark	  Raymond	  have	  developed	  a	  taxonomy	  that	  disaggregates	  the	  practices	  that	  
comprise	  Internet	  governance	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  the	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  Meanings’,	  
American	  Behavioral	  Scientist,	  Vol.43,	  No.35,	  September	  1999.	  
22	  This	  catchphrase	  began	  life	  as	  a	  sign	  in	  the	  Clinton	  campaign	  headquarters	  in	  Arkansas.	  A	  message	  crafted	  by	  
James	  Carville,	  political	  consultant	  and	  lead	  strategist	  on	  the	  Clinton	  campaign.	  See	  Mary	  Matalin	  and	  James	  
Carville	  with	  Peter	  Knobler,	  All’s	  Fair:	  Love,	  War,	  and	  Running	  for	  President,	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1994).	  
research	  and	  development	  specifically	  intended	  to	  promote	  sustainable	  growth	  in	  the	  private	  
sector.23	  
This	  privileging	  of	  the	  US	  private	  sector	  in	  Internet	  governance	  has	  significant	  power	  implications.	  
Without	  suggesting	  that	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  in	  the	  US	  have	  no	  areas	  of	  dispute	  about	  
Internet	  governance,	  Clinton	  and	  Gore’s	  initial	  vision	  for	  the	  Internet	  as	  a	  means	  of	  expanding	  
markets	  to	  enhance	  US	  economic	  power	  in	  a	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  order	  suggests	  that	  their	  interests	  have	  
been	  broadly	  harmonised	  from	  the	  beginning.	  Gore	  made	  an	  important	  observation	  in	  a	  speech	  to	  
Congress	  in	  which	  he	  introduced	  the	  National	  High	  Performance	  Computer	  Technology	  Bill.	  He	  drew	  
a	  comparison	  between	  natural	  resources	  which	  he	  argued	  are	  “the	  natural	  endowment	  of	  nations”	  
and	  information	  technology	  which	  he	  regarded	  as	  “an	  endowment	  which	  can	  be	  created	  wherever	  
there	  is	  sufficient	  talent	  and	  determination”.24	  He	  regarded	  information	  technology	  then,	  as	  a	  
resource	  or	  a	  source	  of	  power	  –	  but	  one	  which	  could	  be	  generated	  through	  human	  endeavour	  rather	  
than	  extracted	  from	  nature.	  The	  private	  sector,	  in	  this	  view,	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  generate	  power	  and	  
this	  was	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Clinton/Gore	  approach	  to	  Internet	  governance	  arrangements	  from	  the	  
beginning.	  	  
Although	  the	  Clinton/Gore	  administration	  took	  considerable	  initiative	  to	  steer	  Internet	  technology	  in	  
the	  direction	  they	  felt	  would	  be	  most	  beneficial	  for	  their	  broader	  goals	  of	  economic	  renewal	  and	  
global	  leadership	  in	  this	  emerging	  technology,	  their	  intention	  was	  always	  that	  once	  established,	  the	  
private	  sector	  would	  move	  forward	  with	  its	  own	  momentum.	  The	  privatisation	  and	  
commercialisation	  of	  the	  Internet	  in	  the	  mid	  90s	  was	  a	  clear	  expression	  of	  this	  strategy.	  Prior	  to	  this,	  
the	  Internet	  infrastructure	  was	  owned	  and	  operated	  predominantly	  by	  the	  US	  government.25	  While	  
it	  was	  already	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  considerable	  commercial	  potential	  related	  to	  its	  use,	  the	  
Acceptable	  Use	  Policy	  (AUP)	  prohibited	  any	  commercial	  data	  on	  the	  network.26	  It	  was	  restricted	  
instead	  to	  research	  and	  government	  traffic.	  The	  AUP	  was	  intended	  to	  prompt	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  
build	  out	  the	  infrastructure	  at	  its	  own	  financial	  risk	  –	  something	  they	  would	  not	  have	  the	  incentive	  
to	  do	  if	  permitted	  to	  use	  the	  existing	  backbone	  for	  commerce.	  By	  supporting	  Internet	  technology	  
research	  and	  implementation	  enough	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  potential	  but	  prohibiting	  the	  commercial	  
use	  of	  it,	  the	  Clinton/Gore	  administration	  successfully	  shifted	  the	  burden	  from	  the	  public	  purse	  to	  
the	  private	  sector.	  
It	  was	  within	  this	  same	  context	  of	  the	  government	  taking	  initiative	  and	  ‘leading	  the	  private	  sector	  to	  
water’,	  that	  Internet	  governance	  arrangements	  began	  to	  develop.	  One	  of	  the	  primary	  focuses	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Governor	  William	  J.	  Clinton,	  remarks	  at	  the	  Wharton	  School	  of	  Business,	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania,	  
Philadelphia,	  April	  16,	  1992,	  http://www.ibiblio.org/nii/econ-­‐posit.html	  .	  
24	  Senator	  Albert	  Gore	  Jr.,	  speech	  to	  Congress	  introducing	  the	  National	  High-­‐Performance	  Computer	  
Technology	  Bill,	  (the	  Gore	  Bill)	  on	  May	  18,	  1989.	  Full	  text	  available	  at	  
http://w2.eff.org/Infrastructure/Old/s1067_89_gore_hpc.bill.	  The	  bill	  would	  eventually	  be	  passed	  in	  1991	  as	  
The	  High	  Performance	  Computing	  Act	  of	  1991	  http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-­‐
bin/query/F?c102:20:./temp/~mdbsTGH4wS:e37166:.	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  this	  legislation,	  see	  the	  National	  
Coordination	  Office	  for	  Networking	  and	  Information	  Technology	  Research	  and	  Development	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.nitrd.gov/congressional/laws/pl_102-­‐194.html	  .	  
25	  For	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  funding	  was	  organised	  in	  1990,	  see	  Brian	  Kahin,	  ‘RFC1192	  –	  Commercialization	  of	  
the	  Internet,	  Summary	  Report’,	  issued	  as	  a	  Request	  for	  Comments	  by	  the	  Network	  Working	  Group,	  Harvard,	  
November	  1990,	  http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1192.html	  .	  
26	  For	  background	  on	  this,	  see	  the	  National	  Science	  Foundation	  (NSF)	  web	  site,	  ‘The	  Internet:	  Changing	  the	  
Way	  we	  Communicate’,	  http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/nsf0050/internet/internet.htm.	  
post-­‐commercialisation	  phase	  was	  the	  management	  and	  constant	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  domain	  
names	  and	  IP	  address	  numbers	  that	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  smooth	  functioning	  of	  the	  Internet.	  This	  
‘Domain	  Name	  System’	  (DNS)	  had	  been	  managed	  prior	  to	  the	  commercialisation	  and	  privatisation	  of	  
the	  Internet	  by	  an	  academic	  at	  Stanford	  University,	  Jon	  Postel.	  However,	  the	  extraordinary	  growth	  in	  
requests	  for	  new	  domain	  names	  and	  IP	  addresses	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  made	  this	  untenable	  and	  
dialogue	  opened	  up	  about	  how	  to	  manage	  what	  was	  then	  regarded	  as	  a	  purely	  technical	  function.27	  
While	  there	  is	  some	  debate	  about	  how	  consultative	  this	  period	  was,	  the	  significant	  point	  for	  this	  
article	  is	  that	  once	  again,	  the	  Clinton/Gore	  administration	  saw	  the	  private	  sector	  as	  the	  appropriate	  
locus	  for	  managing	  this	  function.	  The	  Internet	  Corporation	  for	  Assigned	  Names	  and	  Numbers	  
(ICANN)	  was	  established	  in	  1998	  as	  a	  private,	  not-­‐for-­‐profit	  organisation	  registered	  in	  the	  state	  of	  
California	  and	  linked	  by	  a	  zero	  dollar	  contract	  to	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Commerce.	  28	  	  	  
From	  a	  technical	  and	  functional	  perspective,	  ICANN	  has	  been	  an	  extremely	  effective	  mechanism	  for	  
managing	  the	  DNS	  in	  a	  period	  of	  remarkable	  growth.	  There	  are	  however,	  a	  range	  of	  political	  factors	  
that	  were	  not	  anticipated	  when	  it	  was	  established	  in	  1998	  that	  have	  led	  some	  to	  challenge	  ICANN’s	  
role	  as	  a	  policy	  making	  body.	  Some	  of	  these	  provide	  insight	  into	  the	  implications	  of	  territory	  and	  
sovereignty	  in	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  process.29	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  newly	  emergent	  states	  
and	  secessionist	  movements,	  ICANN	  has	  the	  power	  to	  allocate	  ‘country	  code	  Top	  Level	  Domains’	  
(ccTLD).	  These	  ccTLDs	  (.uk,	  .au,	  .cn)	  effectively	  delineate	  national	  cyberspace	  and	  also	  to	  an	  extent	  
legitimise	  a	  sovereign	  space.	  In	  addition,	  the	  inequitable	  allocation	  of	  resources	  has	  been	  a	  
contentious	  issue.	  Under	  the	  original	  protocol	  of	  IPV4,	  IP	  addresses	  have	  run	  out	  –	  at	  least,	  they	  have	  
now	  all	  been	  allocated	  to	  registries.30	  Of	  these	  IP	  addresses,	  some	  74%	  are	  allocated	  to	  the	  US	  
despite	  the	  fact	  that	  China	  now	  has	  538	  million	  people	  online	  (only	  40%	  of	  their	  population)	  and	  the	  
US	  has	  only	  245	  million	  (78%	  of	  their	  population).31	  This	  disparity	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  what	  is	  
essentially	  a	  commercial	  product	  with	  implications	  for	  access	  and	  expansion	  situates	  this	  aspect	  of	  
global	  Internet	  governance	  back	  in	  a	  Westphalian	  framework.32	  	  
ICANN	  and	  its	  functions	  are	  just	  one	  element	  of	  global	  Internet	  governance	  –	  as	  articulated	  in	  De	  
Nardis’	  and	  Raymond’s	  recent	  taxonomy.33	  However,	  it	  has	  been	  an	  important	  and	  contentious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Those	  engaged	  included	  key	  figures	  in	  the	  Internet	  technology	  community,	  business	  and	  civil	  liberties	  
organisations	  amongst	  others.	  For	  a	  comprehensive	  list	  of	  these	  stakeholders	  and	  their	  interests,	  see	  Milton	  
Mueller,	  Net	  Neutrality	  as	  Global	  Principle	  for	  Internet	  Governance,	  (Syracuse,	  NY:	  Internet	  Governance	  
Project,	  5	  November	  2007),	  pp.166-­‐167.	  
28	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  ICANN	  operates	  under	  a	  zero	  dollar	  contract	  to	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  
though	  this	  is	  up	  for	  review	  in	  2015.	  
29	  A	  whole	  range	  of	  legitimacy	  challenges	  have	  led	  to	  ICANN	  remaining	  in	  some	  form	  of	  US	  government	  
oversight	  though	  this	  is	  under	  constant	  review	  and	  revision.	  For	  an	  authoritative	  account	  of	  this,	  see	  Milton	  
Mueller,	  Ruling	  the	  Root,	  (Cambridge:	  The	  MIT	  Press,	  2002).	  
30	  Steven	  J.	  Vaughan-­‐Nicols,	  ‘Don't	  Panic!	  It's	  only	  the	  Internet	  running	  out	  of	  Addresses’,	  ZDNET,	  February	  3,	  
2011.	  	  
	  http://www.zdnet.com/blog/networking/dont-­‐panic-­‐its-­‐only-­‐the-­‐internet-­‐running-­‐out-­‐of-­‐addresses/656.	  
31	  The	  US	  has	  approximately	  four	  IP	  addresses	  per	  capita	  while	  China	  has	  .2	  per	  capita.	  See	  Iljitsch	  van	  Beijnum,	  
‘Trading	  IPv4	  addresses	  will	  end	  in	  tears’,	  Ars	  Technica,	  August	  29,	  2011.	  
	  http://arstechnica.com/tech-­‐policy/2011/08/trading-­‐ipv4-­‐addresses-­‐will-­‐end-­‐in-­‐tears/.	  For	  usage	  statistics,	  
see	  Internet	  World	  Stats,	  figures	  for	  June	  30,	  2012.	  http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm	  
32	  Yuezhi	  Zhao,	  ‘China's	  Pursuits	  of	  Indigenous	  Innovations	  in	  Information	  Technology	  Developments:	  Hopes,	  
follies	  and	  uncertainties’,	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  Communication,	  Vol.3,	  No.3,	  2011,	  pp.266-­‐289.	  
33	  Laura	  DeNardis	  and	  Mark	  Raymond,	  ‘Thinking	  Clearly	  about	  Multistakeholder	  Internet	  Governance’,	  Paper	  
presented	  at	  the	  Eighth	  Annual	  GigaNet	  Symposium,	  Bali	  Indonesia,	  October	  21,	  2013.	  
element	  and	  it	  is	  a	  site	  of	  debates	  that	  emerge	  from	  sovereign	  concerns	  that	  spill	  over	  into	  the	  
discourse	  on	  multi-­‐stakeholderism.	  In	  a	  move	  that	  mirrored	  their	  handling	  of	  
commercialisation/privatisation,	  the	  US	  government	  had	  taken	  a	  lead	  on	  this	  aspect	  of	  global	  
Internet	  governance	  so	  as	  to	  implement	  their	  vision	  but	  with	  the	  clear	  expectation	  that	  ICANN	  would	  
roll	  over	  into	  private	  hands	  once	  established.34	  Essentially,	  these	  embedded	  expectations	  of	  
public/private	  cooperation	  and	  collaboration	  with	  a	  strong	  preference	  for	  ‘private	  sector	  leadership’	  
were	  the	  discursive	  and	  practical	  antecedents	  to	  the	  particular	  form	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  that	  we	  
see	  in	  place	  today.35	  
	  
The	  Promise	  of	  Multi-­‐stakeholderism	  
The	  development	  of	  ideas	  about	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  as	  a	  progressive	  means	  of	  governance	  can	  be	  
mapped	  onto	  a	  view	  of	  the	  world	  as	  interconnected	  and	  interdependent.	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  
UN	  following	  the	  second	  world	  war,	  although	  initially	  focused	  explicitly	  on	  sovereign	  entities	  
reflected	  the	  sentiment	  that	  fates	  –	  even	  of	  states	  –	  were	  intertwined	  and	  required	  some	  
coordination	  at	  a	  global	  level.	  Many	  trace	  the	  recent	  momentum	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  to	  the	  Rio	  
Summit	  in	  1992	  at	  which	  it	  became	  unequivocally	  clear	  that	  the	  environmental	  and	  developmental	  
challenges	  facing	  the	  planet	  were	  unlikely	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  effectively	  from	  within	  a	  Westphalian	  
framework.36	  In	  this	  vein,	  Cammaerts	  suggests	  that	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  is	  perceived	  as	  “the	  
solution	  to	  solve	  a	  deep	  crisis	  in	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  international	  (and	  national)	  political	  institutions”.37	  
More	  specifically,	  a	  common	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  
governance	  is	  the	  discourse	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  World	  Summit	  on	  the	  Information	  Society	  (WSIS)	  
process	  initiated	  by	  the	  International	  Telecommunications	  Union	  (ITU)	  back	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  
Prompted	  by	  the	  realisation	  that	  coordinating	  global	  telecommunications	  was	  about	  to	  become	  
increasingly	  complex	  the	  ITU	  -­‐	  quite	  reasonably	  given	  its	  extensive	  role	  in	  global	  postal,	  radio	  and	  
television	  coordination	  -­‐	  proposed	  that	  it	  would	  be	  the	  best	  situated	  organisation	  to	  develop	  
emerging	  communications	  technologies	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  promote	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  
development	  globally.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  two	  part	  summit	  –	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  which	  took	  place	  in	  
Geneva	  in	  2003	  and	  the	  second	  in	  Tunisia	  in	  2005.	  One	  of	  the	  outcomes	  of	  this	  process	  was	  the	  
following	  definition	  of	  Internet	  governance:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  While	  ICANN	  is	  only	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  technical/policy/standards	  organisations	  that	  contribute	  to	  Internet	  
governance,	  it	  is	  worth	  looking	  at	  in	  some	  depth	  because	  it	  is	  the	  site	  of	  particular	  contestation	  about	  these	  
issues	  of	  power,	  legitimacy,	  state	  control	  and	  interests.	  
35	  Markus	  Kummer,	  ‘Multistakeholder	  Cooperation:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  phraseology	  in	  
international	  cooperation’,	  Internet	  Society	  Public	  Policy	  Blog,	  May	  14,	  2013.	  
http://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2013/05/multistakeholder-­‐cooperation-­‐reflections-­‐emergence-­‐new-­‐
phraseology-­‐international	  	  
36	  Minu	  Hemmati	  (ed.),	  Multi-­‐stakeholder	  processes	  for	  governance	  and	  sustainability	  beyond	  deadlock	  and	  
conflict,	  (London:	  Earthscan	  Publications,	  2002),	  p1.	  
37	  Bart	  Cammaerts,	  ‘Power	  Dynamics	  in	  Multi-­‐Stakeholder	  Policy	  Processes	  and	  Intra-­‐civil	  Society	  Networking’,	  
in	  The	  Handbook	  of	  Global	  Media	  and	  Communication	  Policy,	  Robin	  Mansell	  and	  Marc	  Raboy	  (eds.),	  (Oxford:	  
Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2011),	  p.134.	  
Internet	  governance	  is	  the	  development	  and	  application	  by	  governments,	  the	  private	  sector	  
and	  civil	  society,	  in	  their	  respective	  roles,	  of	  shared	  principles,	  norms,	  rules,	  decision-­‐making	  
procedures	  and	  programmes	  that	  shape	  the	  evolution	  and	  use	  of	  the	  Internet.38	  
As	  well	  as	  providing	  a	  working	  definition	  for	  Internet	  governance,	  this	  statement	  is	  also	  the	  point	  of	  
reference	  for	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  due	  to	  its	  specification	  of	  three	  distinct	  stakeholders	  and	  their	  
‘respective	  roles’.39	  The	  strengths	  and	  advantages	  of	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  for	  global	  Internet	  
governance	  that	  both	  underpinned	  this	  definition	  and	  continue	  to	  sustain	  the	  momentum	  for	  this	  
approach	  are	  important	  to	  acknowledge	  –	  even	  while	  offering	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  
the	  model.	  
First,	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance	  offers	  the	  promise	  of	  more	  effectively	  recognising	  and	  
accommodating	  the	  multitude	  of	  interests	  around	  this	  issue.	  The	  Internet	  impacts	  significantly	  on	  so	  
many	  diverse	  spheres	  including	  commerce,	  defense,	  culture,	  personal	  communication	  and	  relations,	  
education,	  and	  legal	  issues.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  systems	  like	  the	  environment	  and	  the	  
economy	  do	  not	  –	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  awareness	  and	  perception	  of	  stakeholders	  is	  quite	  intense	  in	  
this	  particular	  context.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  both	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  
technology	  as	  well	  as	  the	  competing	  interests,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  multiple	  actors	  should	  
have	  a	  more	  direct	  say	  in	  how	  it	  is	  governed	  and	  controlled	  than	  would	  normally	  come	  about	  simply	  
through	  government	  representation	  of	  constituents	  in	  a	  multi-­‐lateral	  or	  supra-­‐national	  model.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  its	  promise	  	  of	  wide	  representation,	  the	  second	  reason	  why	  a	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  
is	  so	  appealing	  in	  this	  particular	  context	  is	  that	  bringing	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  actors	  more	  closely	  into	  
the	  decision	  making	  process	  allows	  for	  the	  optimum	  utilisation	  of	  expertise.	  Those	  closest	  to	  the	  
‘bleeding	  edge’	  of	  this	  technology	  are	  able	  to	  offer	  insights	  and	  perspectives	  not	  accessible	  to	  policy	  
makers	  or	  international	  bureaucrats.	  It	  also	  facilitates	  the	  flexibility	  necessary	  to	  adapt	  to	  change,	  
thereby	  maximising	  innovation	  and	  market	  capitalisation.	  	  
The	  third	  reason	  why	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  holds	  out	  real	  promise	  for	  the	  future	  of	  global	  Internet	  
governance	  specifically	  and	  global	  governance	  more	  generally	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Bertrand	  
de	  la	  Chapelle	  who	  argues	  that	  this	  forced	  collaboration	  has	  important	  benefits	  for	  developing	  more	  
sophisticated	  and	  nuanced	  conceptual	  approaches	  to	  both.40	  Not	  only	  do	  governments	  have	  to	  
confront	  the	  expertise	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  (from	  which	  he	  sees	  a	  sense	  of	  legitimacy	  emerge),	  but	  
the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  complex	  policy	  issues	  that	  arise	  from	  
the	  expansion	  of	  Internet	  technology.	  This,	  he	  says,	  runs	  “counter	  to	  early	  claims	  that	  the	  Internet	  
made	  governments	  obsolete	  and	  that	  Internet-­‐related	  issues	  should	  be	  the	  sole	  province	  of	  the	  
private	  sector	  (via	  self-­‐regulation)	  or	  the	  technical	  community.”41	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Working	  Group	  on	  Internet	  Governance	  Report,	  Chateau	  de	  Bossey,	  2005,	  p.4.	  
39	  For	  more	  on	  this	  discursive	  shift	  from	  ‘private-­‐sector	  leadership’	  to	  ‘multi-­‐stakeholderism’,	  see	  Markus	  
Kummer,	  ‘Multistakeholder	  Cooperation:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  phraseology	  in	  international	  
cooperation’,	  Internet	  Society	  Public	  Policy	  Blog,	  May	  14,	  2013.	  
http://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2013/05/multistakeholder-­‐cooperation-­‐reflections-­‐emergence-­‐new-­‐
phraseology-­‐international	  	  
40	  Bertrand	  de	  la	  Chapelle,	  ‘Towards	  Multi-­‐Stakeholder	  Governance	  –	  The	  Internet	  Governance	  Forum	  as	  
Laboratory’,	  in	  The	  Power	  of	  Ideas:	  Internet	  Governance	  in	  a	  Global	  Multi-­‐Stakeholder	  Environment,	  Wolfgang	  
Kleinwachter	  (ed.),	  (Marketing	  for	  Deutschland	  GmbH,	  2007),	  p.260.	  
41	  Bertrand	  de	  la	  Chapelle,	  ‘Towards	  Multi-­‐Stakeholder	  Governance’,	  p.260.	  
Stakeholders	  and	  Power	  
Having	  established	  some	  of	  the	  background	  to	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  and	  having	  
also	  explained	  its	  strengths,	  this	  section	  turns	  now	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  power	  dynamics	  evident	  in	  
each	  of	  the	  three	  ‘stakeholders’	  defined	  by	  the	  WSIS	  declaration;	  governments,	  the	  private	  sector	  
and	  civil	  society.	  As	  foreshadowed	  in	  the	  Introduction,	  the	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  rather	  than	  
substantially	  redistributing	  power,	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  reinforces	  existing	  power	  
dynamics.	  Governments	  continue	  to	  exercise	  power	  and	  despite	  suggestions	  to	  the	  contrary,	  they	  
benefit	  from	  a	  sense	  of	  legitimacy	  generated	  by	  representation	  of	  their	  citizens.	  The	  private	  sector	  
also	  exercises	  power	  though	  they	  face	  considerable	  legitimacy	  challenges	  –	  but	  crucially,	  the	  private	  
sector	  in	  this	  context	  is	  dominated	  by	  huge	  US	  companies	  that	  can	  serve	  to	  aggregate	  rather	  than	  
balance	  US	  government	  power.	  Finally,	  civil	  society	  appears	  to	  exert	  little	  power	  in	  the	  multi-­‐
stakeholder	  process	  but	  it	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  other	  two	  stakeholders	  by	  giving	  the	  impression	  
of	  consultation	  without	  generating	  any	  significant	  friction.	  In	  this	  sense,	  civil	  society	  also	  helps	  to	  
preserve	  the	  status	  quo	  which	  favours	  those	  who	  established	  and	  continue	  to	  promote	  the	  multi-­‐
stakeholder	  model	  in	  its	  current	  form.	  
The	  concept	  of	  power	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  Gramsci’s	  work	  on	  hegemony.	  He	  regarded	  
hegemony	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  “simple	  dominance,	  based	  upon	  a	  preponderance	  of	  coercive	  power	  
or	  material	  resources”	  but	  as	  a	  social	  form	  of	  power	  based	  on	  relations	  of	  consensus.	  42	  In	  essence,	  
Gramsci	  regarded	  the	  capacity	  for	  dominant	  groups	  to	  generate	  consent	  through	  the	  articulation	  of	  
“a	  political	  vision,	  an	  ideology,	  which	  claimed	  to	  speak	  for	  all	  and	  which	  resonated	  with	  beliefs	  
widely	  held	  in	  popular	  political	  culture”	  as	  an	  important	  form	  of	  power.43	  Although	  Gramsci’s	  work	  
was	  predominantly	  situated	  in	  the	  domestic,	  Robert	  Cox	  extended	  this	  notion	  of	  hegemonic	  power	  
to	  develop	  his	  own	  ideas	  about	  a	  reconceptualised	  state/society	  complex	  that	  brought	  together	  a	  
range	  of	  actors,	  loci	  and	  structures.	  In	  Cox’s	  reading	  of	  Gramsci	  (and	  Machiavelli),	  the	  notion	  of	  
hegemonic	  power	  could	  be	  disaggregated	  from	  specific	  social	  classes	  and	  applied	  more	  broadly	  to	  
relations	  of	  dominance	  and	  subordination	  wherever	  they	  resided.44	  Through	  his	  work	  on	  power	  and	  
international	  political	  economy,	  Cox	  demonstrated	  that	  in	  large	  systems	  like	  economics	  (or	  Internet	  
governance),	  this	  notion	  of	  hegemonic	  power	  and	  a	  ‘historic	  bloc’	  of	  social	  forces	  can	  operate	  at	  a	  
global	  level.45	  	  
This	  expansive	  view	  of	  hegemonic	  power	  relations	  is	  able	  to	  encompass	  the	  complexities	  of	  state	  
and	  civil	  society	  elements	  in	  global	  Internet	  governance.	  In	  her	  latest	  book,	  Marianne	  Franklin	  argues	  
that	  “[a]s	  the	  internet	  and	  its	  (non)regulation	  becomes	  increasingly	  identified	  with	  discourses	  of	  
multistakeholderism,	  posited	  as	  the	  antidote	  to	  state	  oppression,	  both	  corporations	  and	  ‘good-­‐guy’	  
state	  actors	  have	  been	  increasingly	  alert	  and	  proactive	  in	  controlling	  not	  only	  the	  agenda	  but	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Mark	  Rupert,	  ‘Antonio	  Gramsci’	  in	  Critical	  Theorists	  and	  International	  Relations,	  Jenny	  Edkins	  and	  Nick	  
Vaughan-­‐Williams	  (eds.),	  (Oxon:	  Routledge,	  2009),	  p177.	  
43	  Ibid.	  
44	  Robert	  W.	  Cox,	  ‘Gramsci,	  Hegemony	  and	  International	  Relations	  :	  An	  Essay	  in	  Method’,	  Millennium:	  Journal	  
of	  International	  Studies,	  Vol.12,	  No.2,	  June	  1983,	  pp.162-­‐175.	  
45	  Stephen	  R.	  Gill	  and	  David	  Law,	  ‘Global	  Hegemony	  and	  the	  Structural	  Power	  of	  Capital’,	  International	  Studies	  
Quarterly,	  Vol.33,	  No.4,	  Dec.1989,	  p.477.	  Also	  see	  Stephen	  Gill,	  ‘Hegemony,	  Consensus	  and	  Trilateralism’,	  
Review	  of	  International	  Studies,	  Vol.12,	  No.3,	  July	  1986,	  pp.205-­‐221.	  
patrolling	  public	  debates.”	  46	  The	  following	  sections	  articulate	  how	  each	  of	  the	  relevant	  stakeholders	  
fit	  within	  this	  Gramscian	  matrix	  of	  hegemonic	  power.	  
Governments	  
There	  are	  two	  primary	  tensions	  around	  the	  role	  of	  governments	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  
governance.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  if	  states’	  interests	  are	  not	  closely	  aligned	  with	  those	  of	  the	  US	  which	  
plays	  a	  dominant	  role,	  both	  through	  its	  oversight	  of	  ICANN	  and	  its	  general	  influence	  in	  international	  
affairs,	  there	  emerges	  a	  preference	  for	  greater	  equity	  between	  states	  in	  Internet	  governance.	  In	  
response	  to	  the	  Snowden	  leaks,	  Brazilian	  President	  Dilma	  Rouseff	  	  hosted	  an	  international	  meeting	  
to	  re-­‐evaluate	  global	  Internet	  governance.	  The	  NetMundial	  meeting	  was	  held	  in	  April	  2014	  in	  Sao	  
Paulo	  and	  in	  her	  opening	  speech	  Rouseff	  argued	  that	  in	  this	  context	  relations	  must	  be	  based	  on	  
equality	  so	  that	  all	  governments	  participate	  on	  an	  “equal	  footing”.47	  	  
The	  second	  tension	  around	  the	  role	  of	  governments	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  is	  that	  
limiting	  the	  role	  of	  governments	  is	  regarded	  by	  some	  as	  essential	  for	  the	  health	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  
Internet	  governance.	  This	  obviously	  meets	  resistance	  from	  states	  that	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  promote	  
their	  national	  interest	  or	  sense	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  competition	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  
stakeholders.	  Both	  of	  these	  tensions	  have	  power	  and	  legitimacy	  at	  their	  core	  and	  both	  need	  to	  be	  
taken	  into	  account	  when	  considering	  the	  future	  of	  Internet	  governance.	  Ultimately	  though,	  the	  first	  
tension	  –	  that	  states	  would	  prefer	  more	  equity	  amongst	  one	  another,	  is	  less	  controversial	  and	  less	  
specific	  to	  Internet	  governance.	  Limiting	  government	  involvement	  relative	  to	  other	  stakeholders	  
however,	  is	  essential	  to	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  Internet	  governance	  –	  an	  outcome	  that	  is	  most	  
favourable	  to	  those	  actors	  that	  helped	  establish	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  section	  addresses	  the	  
counter	  arguments	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  governments	  should	  play	  a	  limited	  role	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  
Internet	  governance	  in	  order	  to	  expose	  the	  power	  dynamics	  that	  are	  served	  by	  promoting	  that	  view.	  	  
The	  dominant	  theme	  that	  governments	  should	  not	  (or	  cannot)	  be	  the	  sole	  arbiters	  of	  how	  the	  
Internet	  is	  governed	  is	  based	  in	  part	  on	  the	  obvious	  technical	  factors	  that	  call	  for	  coordination	  
between	  non-­‐state	  actors	  like	  Internet	  service	  providers,	  Internet	  exchange	  points,	  
telecommunications	  firms	  and	  Internet	  standards	  setting	  bodies.	  In	  addition	  to	  this	  though,	  there	  is	  
a	  persistent	  concern	  that	  involving	  states	  in	  Internet	  governance	  practices	  and	  processes	  will	  see	  the	  
Internet	  mired	  in	  politics	  which	  would	  potentially	  undermine	  progress	  and	  innovation.48	  There	  are	  
two	  problems	  inherent	  in	  this	  assumption;	  first,	  beyond	  the	  most	  basic	  intent	  that	  the	  network	  
functions	  in	  a	  reliable	  manner,	  there	  are	  many	  competing	  ideas	  about	  what	  constitutes	  a	  ‘good’	  or	  
‘open’	  or	  ‘secure’	  Internet.	  For	  example,	  an	  Internet	  that	  is	  secure	  for	  the	  producers	  of	  intellectual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Marianne	  Franklin,	  Digital	  Dilemmas:	  Power,	  Resistance	  and	  the	  Internet,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2013),	  pp190-­‐191.	  
47	  Dilma	  Rouseff,	  Speech	  opening	  the	  NetMundial	  meeting	  in	  Brazil	  on	  April	  23,	  2014.,	  pp.7-­‐8.	  
http://netmundial.br/wp-­‐content/uploads/2014/04/NETMundial-­‐23April2014-­‐Dilma-­‐Rousseff-­‐Opening-­‐
Speech-­‐en.pdf,	  	  
48	  Terry	  Kramer,	  Ambassador	  U.S.	  Head	  of	  Delegation	  to	  the	  World	  Conference	  on	  International	  
Telecommunications	  has	  stated	  that	  ‘All	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  growth	  of	  the	  internet	  have	  come	  as	  a	  result	  not	  
of	  government	  action	  or	  of	  intergovernmental	  treaty.	  They	  are	  an	  organic	  expression	  of	  consumer	  demand	  
and	  societal	  needs,	  along	  with	  other	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance.’	  Prepared	  remarks,	  Dubai,	  United	  Arab	  
Emirates,	  December	  13,	  2012.	  http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/202040.htm	  	  
property	  is	  primarily	  of	  interest	  to	  those	  who	  produce	  it,	  not	  those	  who	  consume	  it.49	  Online	  privacy	  
is	  important	  in	  cultures	  that	  value	  individual	  rights	  whereas	  personal	  accountability	  and	  
transparency	  can	  be	  more	  important	  in	  cultures	  based	  on	  communitarian	  values.	  
This	  first	  problematic	  assumption	  leads	  directly	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  legitimate	  representation.	  In	  a	  
Westphalian	  model	  of	  governance,	  states	  represent	  these	  varied	  norms	  and	  interests	  of	  their	  
populations	  and	  work	  to	  promote	  and	  protect	  them	  from	  external	  influences.	  The	  emergence	  of	  
global	  governance	  has	  opened	  up	  the	  space	  for	  us	  to	  reconsider	  alternative	  modes	  of	  representation	  
and	  political	  organisation	  but	  there	  is	  little	  to	  indicate	  at	  this	  stage	  that	  governments	  have	  been	  
absolved	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  protecting	  and	  promoting	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  citizens	  –	  offline	  as	  
well	  as	  online.	  And	  because	  there	  is	  little	  that	  is	  universal	  in	  these	  norms	  and	  interests,	  Internet	  
governance	  remains	  a	  politically	  contentious	  sphere.	  Peng	  Hwa	  Ang	  has	  argued	  that	  governments	  
have	  a	  role	  to	  play	  because	  “rights	  to	  intellectual	  property,	  privacy	  and	  reputation	  would	  only	  be	  
most	  effectively	  dealt	  with	  by	  governments”.50	  Self-­‐help,	  social	  etiquette	  and	  technology,	  he	  argues,	  
can	  take	  us	  only	  so	  far.51	  In	  order	  to	  counter	  the	  power	  that	  governments	  might	  wield	  due	  to	  this	  
representative	  legitimacy	  opponents	  argue	  that	  governments	  themselves	  politicise	  these	  issues	  –	  
rather	  than	  acknowledging	  that	  they	  are	  already	  politicised	  and	  governments	  offer	  representation	  to	  
their	  population.	  
The	  second	  reason	  why	  limiting	  government	  involvement	  in	  global	  Internet	  governance	  needs	  
careful	  thought	  has	  to	  do	  with	  sustainability.	  Thinking	  about	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  initially	  emerged	  
from	  the	  environmental	  sector	  where	  one	  of	  the	  key	  incentives	  was	  to	  develop	  a	  sustainable	  
governance	  model	  in	  a	  similarly	  complex	  and	  post-­‐sovereign	  context.52	  The	  object	  was	  to	  bring	  all	  
parties	  to	  the	  table	  together	  to	  seek	  a	  solution	  that	  would	  endure	  and	  not	  break	  down	  at	  the	  
domestic	  level.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  post-­‐war	  Bretton	  Woods	  arrangement	  is	  understood	  to	  
have	  been	  so	  enduring	  is	  because	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  more	  or	  less	  designed	  to	  promote	  national	  interests	  
equally	  rather	  than	  overly	  privileging	  one	  state	  over	  another.53	  If	  governments	  find	  they	  are	  
disenfranchised	  or	  disempowered	  in	  terms	  of	  Internet	  governance,	  the	  option	  of	  ‘Internet	  
sovereignty’	  (in	  which	  the	  Internet	  is	  regarded	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  sovereign	  space	  rather	  than	  a	  
global	  sphere)	  becomes	  an	  attractive	  option	  as	  demonstrated	  to	  some	  extent	  already	  by	  China	  and	  
Iran.	  This	  is	  represented	  in	  the	  discourse	  as	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  ‘Balkanised’	  Internet	  –	  one	  that	  simply	  
links	  sovereign	  networks	  together.	  Significantly,	  Mueller	  and	  Wagner	  make	  the	  important	  point	  that	  
many	  of	  the	  states	  that	  promote	  a	  sovereign	  view	  of	  the	  Internet	  in	  which	  governments	  should	  take	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  Dan	  Drezner,	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the	  lead	  are	  newly	  independent	  and	  nationalism	  is	  regarded	  as	  an	  important	  element	  of	  building	  
social	  and	  political	  cohesion.54	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  ‘Balkanisation’	  debate	  is	  not	  simply	  located	  in	  non-­‐Western,	  
autocratic	  states.	  All	  states	  expect	  their	  national	  laws	  to	  be	  obeyed	  –	  even	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  
Internet.	  The	  ‘Law	  Enforcement	  Report’	  issued	  by	  Vodafone	  in	  June	  2014	  made	  this	  clear	  as	  it	  
documented	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  legally	  obliged	  to	  hand	  over	  customer	  data	  to	  governments	  –	  
many	  of	  them	  in	  the	  West.	  55	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  more	  sustainable	  model	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  
Internet	  governance	  may	  actually	  be	  one	  that	  allows	  for	  competing	  views	  such	  as	  those	  outlined	  
above	  to	  be	  articulated	  and	  dealt	  with	  in	  a	  way	  that	  leaves	  governments	  confident	  that	  their	  
national	  interest	  is	  more	  or	  less	  equally	  accommodated	  in	  the	  arrangements.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  narrative	  about	  the	  need	  to	  limit	  government	  involvement	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  
governance	  does	  not	  impact	  on	  all	  states	  to	  the	  same	  extent.	  Because	  the	  US	  has	  been	  so	  successful	  
in	  embedding	  its	  view	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance	  practices,	  functions	  and	  norms,	  it	  
and	  states	  aligned	  ideologically	  with	  its	  ‘Internet	  Freedom’	  approach	  can	  afford	  to	  promote	  a	  view	  of	  
limited	  government	  involvement.	  Essentially,	  this	  serves	  to	  limit	  oppositional	  government	  input.	  This	  
played	  out	  quite	  dramatically	  at	  the	  World	  Conference	  on	  International	  Telecommunications	  (WCIT)	  
in	  December	  2012.	  	  
Hosted	  by	  the	  ITU,	  this	  conference	  was	  intended	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  review	  and	  update	  the	  
International	  Telecommunication	  Regulations	  (ITRs),	  which	  ‘serve	  as	  the	  binding	  global	  treaty	  
designed	  to	  facilitate	  international	  interconnection	  and	  interoperability	  of	  information	  and	  
communication	  services’.56	  Many	  developing	  states	  which	  tend	  to	  have	  less	  privatisation	  in	  their	  
telecoms	  sector	  and	  much	  closer	  ties	  between	  government	  and	  industry	  would	  prefer	  to	  have	  
Internet	  governance	  issues	  handled	  through	  an	  interstate	  agency	  like	  the	  ITU.57	  There	  are	  differing	  
views	  on	  the	  utility	  of	  updating	  the	  ITRs	  but	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  WCIT	  the	  US	  vigorously	  promoted	  
the	  ITU	  initiative	  as	  a	  proposed	  ‘UN	  takeover’	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  a	  potential	  victory	  for	  authoritarian	  
states	  that	  believed	  that	  some	  kind	  of	  supra-­‐national	  Internet	  governance	  model	  would	  better	  allow	  
them	  to	  promote	  their	  own	  interests.	  Despite	  the	  diplomatic	  power	  of	  the	  US	  and	  its	  supporters	  like	  
Australia	  and	  the	  EU,	  89	  countries	  voted	  for	  the	  changes	  with	  only	  55	  voting	  alongside	  the	  US	  to	  
dispute	  them.	  The	  result	  was	  an	  impasse	  with	  the	  ITRs	  being	  put	  back	  on	  the	  shelf	  unrevised	  but	  the	  
lesson	  was	  that	  diplomatic	  leveraging	  is	  very	  much	  a	  part	  of	  global	  Internet	  governance.	  
Attempts	  to	  limit	  government	  involvement	  in	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  process	  then,	  serve	  to	  preserve	  
the	  status	  quo	  by	  actually	  limiting	  oppositional	  government	  influence	  that	  might	  promote	  views	  
counter	  to	  those	  held	  by	  the	  ‘north-­‐west’	  states.	  Because	  governments	  are	  unlikely	  to	  cede	  
sovereign	  control	  in	  areas	  they	  deem	  central	  to	  the	  national	  interest,	  this	  produces	  concerns	  about	  
sustainability	  of	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model	  with	  potential	  for	  a	  further	  ‘Balkanisation’	  of	  the	  
Internet.	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  The	  (US)	  Private	  Sector	  
The	  private	  sector	  is	  clearly	  integral	  to	  Internet	  governance	  and	  as	  one	  of	  the	  three	  stakeholders	  in	  
the	  WSIS	  defined	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model,	  it	  exercises	  considerable	  power.	  Much	  of	  the	  Internet	  
infrastructure	  is	  privately	  owned	  and	  operated	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  West,	  as	  are	  online	  services.	  The	  
elevation	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  Internet	  governance	  was	  a	  clear	  agenda	  of	  the	  US	  from	  the	  
beginning,	  as	  has	  been	  outlined	  previously	  in	  this	  article.	  Even	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ICANN	  with	  which	  
the	  US	  government	  has	  had	  a	  complex	  and	  challenging	  relationship,	  the	  preference	  for	  a	  private	  
sector	  led	  model	  has	  been	  consistently	  expressed	  because	  it	  ‘reflect[s]	  the	  public	  interest,	  is	  best	  
able	  to	  flexibly	  meet	  the	  changing	  needs	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  of	  Internet	  users’.58	  There	  are	  two	  key	  
problems	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  legitimacy	  in	  global	  Internet	  governance;	  first,	  the	  disproportionate	  
influence	  of	  the	  US	  private	  sector	  can	  serve	  to	  aggregate	  rather	  than	  balance	  US	  state	  power	  due	  to	  
the	  longstanding	  alignment	  of	  interests.	  Second,	  the	  private	  sector	  faces	  real	  challenges	  to	  its	  
legitimacy	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  in	  terms	  of	  representation.	  	  
Mueller	  and	  Wagner	  outline	  the	  difficulties	  of	  constructing	  representative	  non-­‐governmental	  
‘stakeholder	  groups’	  for	  the	  NETmundial	  meeting	  in	  Brazil.	  59	  Unlike	  governments,	  neither	  the	  
business	  community	  nor	  civil	  society	  has	  the	  “well-­‐designed	  institutions	  or	  procedures”	  necessary	  
for	  appointing	  representatives	  that	  would	  be	  regarded	  globally	  as	  legitimate.	  60	  In	  this	  vacuum,	  the	  
International	  Chamber	  of	  Commerce’s	  Business	  Allied	  to	  Support	  the	  Information	  Society	  (ICC	  BASIS)	  
proposed	  five	  business	  representatives	  for	  the	  1Net	  coordinating	  committee	  –	  all	  of	  whom	  were	  
“Americans	  working	  for	  US	  companies	  (Facebook,	  Google,	  Microsoft,	  21st	  Century	  Fox,	  and	  an	  ICANN	  
consultant).”	  61	  This	  clearly	  is	  not	  representative	  of	  smaller	  firms	  or	  non-­‐western	  firms.	  There	  is	  an	  
implicit	  suggestion	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  these	  US	  multi-­‐nationals	  based	  on	  market	  share	  and	  global	  reach.	  
However,	  even	  if	  those	  were	  accepted	  criteria	  for	  legitimate	  representation	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  
Internet	  governance,	  questions	  arise	  about	  why	  we	  see	  so	  few	  (if	  any)	  representatives	  from	  Chinese	  
firms	  like	  Huawei,	  Baidu	  or	  TenCent	  engaged	  in	  these	  practices.	  
The	  interests	  of	  these	  large	  US	  corporations	  and	  the	  US	  government	  are	  aligned	  through	  what	  
Stephen	  Gill	  has	  termed	  ‘disciplinary	  neoliberalism’.	  62	  In	  a	  1995	  article	  in	  this	  journal,	  Gill	  described	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  discourses	  about	  governance	  that	  emphasise	  “efficiency,	  welfare,	  and	  freedom	  of	  
the	  market”	  actually	  produce	  hierarchies	  that	  privilege	  corporate	  capital.	  63	  	  Mobilising	  the	  private	  
sector	  to	  drive	  Internet	  growth	  was	  a	  proxy	  for	  US	  national	  interest	  and	  it	  continues	  to	  be.	  Or	  at	  
least,	  it	  is	  so	  closely	  aligned	  as	  to	  produce	  relatively	  little	  tension	  between	  these	  stakeholders.	  From	  
the	  US	  private	  sector’s	  perspective,	  strong	  relations	  with	  the	  US	  government	  on	  Internet	  governance	  
has	  worked	  advantageously.	  Despite	  the	  US	  government	  emphasis	  on	  Internet	  Freedom,	  the	  US	  
private	  sector	  has	  arguably	  done	  more	  to	  ‘Balkanise’	  the	  Internet	  than	  any	  other	  actor	  through	  the	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promotion	  and	  enforcement	  of	  digital	  rights	  management	  and	  it	  has	  been	  able	  to	  rely	  upon	  US	  
government	  support	  throughout.	  The	  overlay	  of	  a	  sovereign	  map	  on	  top	  of	  the	  Internet	  has	  most	  
effectively	  been	  established	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  location	  based	  services,	  intrusive	  software	  
applications	  that	  exploit	  user	  privacy	  in	  return	  for	  services	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  international	  norms	  
that	  allow	  for	  the	  control	  of	  information	  on	  commercial	  but	  not	  cultural	  or	  political	  grounds.	  This	  ‘re-­‐
territorialisation’	  of	  the	  Internet	  has	  worked	  very	  much	  in	  the	  favour	  of	  the	  US	  private	  sector	  (and	  
the	  intelligence	  community).	  	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  these	  mutually	  reinforcing	  interests	  and	  synergistic	  power	  dynamics,	  questions	  
remain	  about	  how	  the	  private	  sector	  (US	  or	  global)	  generate	  legitimacy	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  
governance.	  Unelected,	  lacking	  in	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  (except	  to	  their	  shareholders),	  
the	  private	  sector	  prefer,	  find	  Padovani	  and	  Pavan,	  “non-­‐publicly	  accessible	  ways	  to	  conduct	  their	  
business	  in	  the	  Internet	  governance	  context,	  and	  are	  therefore	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  democratic	  
potential	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  practice.”64	  Instead,	  the	  sector	  derives	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
Internet	  governance	  from	  two	  alternative	  sources;	  from	  its	  ‘expertise’	  which	  has	  been	  discussed	  
already	  as	  a	  positive	  attribute	  of	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model,	  and	  also	  from	  its	  discursive	  alignment	  
with	  civil	  society	  interests.	  	  
Despite	  the	  concerning	  privacy	  breaches	  built	  into	  the	  business	  model	  of	  free	  online	  applications	  and	  
services,	  the	  private	  sector	  works	  hard	  to	  promote	  a	  discourse	  about	  its	  capacity	  and	  desire	  to	  
reinforce	  the	  wants	  and	  needs	  of	  civil	  society	  –	  especially	  in	  the	  face	  of	  government	  heavy	  
handedness.	  This	  has	  been	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  the	  private	  sector’s	  legitimacy	  but	  it	  is	  a	  flimsy	  
platform.	  Prior	  to	  the	  Snowden	  leaks	  that	  revealed	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  US	  intelligence	  
community	  relied	  upon	  personal	  data	  gathered	  by	  these	  US	  information	  firms,	  a	  number	  of	  private	  
sector	  organisations	  established	  the	  Global	  Network	  Initiative	  (GNI)	  specifically	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
supporting	  one	  another	  to	  deal	  with	  government	  requests	  of	  information	  on	  their	  clients.65	  In	  a	  post-­‐
Snowden	  world	  though,	  the	  GNI	  would	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  conceived	  to	  address	  information	  
requests	  by	  non-­‐Western	  governments	  as	  it	  appeared	  to	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  (still	  unclear)	  
collaboration	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  US	  intelligence	  community	  on	  the	  Prism	  project.	  Recent	  
revelations	  about	  Facebook	  secretly	  manipulating	  the	  news	  feeds	  of	  700,000	  customers	  for	  a	  
research	  project	  further	  undermines	  this	  narrative	  of	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society	  alignment.66	  
These	  legitimacy	  challenges	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  the	  private	  sector	  use	  to	  mitigate	  them,	  
combined	  with	  the	  synergy	  between	  the	  dominant	  US	  private	  sector	  and	  the	  US	  government	  serve	  
to	  aggregate	  rather	  than	  balance	  or	  counter	  power	  in	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  process.	  The	  final	  
stakeholder	  to	  be	  considered	  is	  civil	  society.	  
Civil	  Society	  
Looking	  at	  the	  taxonomy	  of	  Internet	  governance	  functions	  produced	  by	  DeNardis	  and	  Raymond,	  civil	  
society	  is	  notably	  absent.	  Within	  the	  six	  functional	  areas	  they	  have	  identified	  and	  the	  44	  specific	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tasks	  within	  those	  functions,	  civil	  society	  is	  not	  the	  primary	  institutional	  actor	  for	  any	  of	  them	  which	  
suggest	  that	  it	  has	  a	  role	  distinct	  from	  either	  government	  or	  the	  private	  sector.	  67	  In	  an	  analysis	  of	  
power	  dynamics	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance,	  civil	  society	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  least	  
influential	  stakeholder	  despite	  its	  equal	  billing	  in	  the	  WSIS	  definition.	  This	  section	  argues	  that	  power	  
is	  virtually	  indiscernible	  in	  civil	  society	  participation	  in	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  process.	  This	  is	  due	  in	  
part	  to	  legitimacy	  challenges	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  difficulties	  of	  coordination	  and	  representation.	  
However,	  this	  inefficiency	  and	  consequent	  powerlessness	  is	  an	  important	  element	  of	  the	  overall	  
power	  dynamics	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholderism.	  Essentially,	  it	  allows	  the	  other	  two	  stakeholders	  to	  
acknowledge	  the	  validity	  of	  civil	  society	  input	  and	  obtain	  “the	  endorsement	  of	  civil	  society-­‐based	  
organizations”	  without	  having	  to	  contend	  with	  them	  in	  any	  significant	  way.	  68	  
Jan	  Aart	  Scholte	  has	  studied	  civil	  society	  in	  global	  governance	  extensively	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  global	  
financial	  sector.	  He	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  an	  accountability	  deficit	  in	  many	  contemporary	  global	  
governance	  arrangements	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  adequate	  oversight	  of	  increasingly	  powerful	  institutions	  
and	  actors	  like	  UN	  agencies,	  multilateral	  financial	  institutions	  and	  regulatory	  bodies.69	  This	  
accountability	  deficit	  has	  in	  part	  prompted	  the	  rise	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  intent	  on	  bringing	  
“greater	  public	  control	  to	  global	  governance”.	  70	  In	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  governance,	  this	  
promise	  of	  providing	  oversight	  and	  accountability	  to	  the	  other	  stakeholders	  is	  coupled	  with	  a	  
normative	  agenda	  of	  promoting	  values	  like	  human	  rights,	  a	  free	  and	  open	  Internet,	  equal	  access	  and	  
net	  neutrality.	  Civil	  society,	  not	  driven	  by	  pecuniary	  gain	  or	  public	  office	  focuses	  instead	  on	  
enhancing	  the	  rule	  making	  undertaken	  by	  other	  stakeholders.	  Despite	  even	  this	  relatively	  
constrained	  role	  in	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  process,	  civil	  society	  suffers	  from	  legitimacy	  challenges	  due	  
to	  the	  difficulty	  of	  representing	  wide	  and	  diverse	  views	  and	  also	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  oversight	  and	  
accountability	  within	  civil	  society	  itself.	  	  
The	  diversity	  of	  views	  that	  could	  be	  represented	  by	  civil	  society	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  
governance	  is	  less	  than	  the	  reality	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  participation.	  Attendance	  at	  
international	  meetings	  is	  expensive	  and	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  all	  but	  the	  well-­‐funded	  who	  tend	  to	  
work	  for	  NGOs	  that	  promote	  a	  particular	  agenda.	  Very	  often,	  this	  is	  a	  human	  rights	  agenda	  –	  an	  
important	  and	  desirable	  one,	  but	  as	  contentious	  in	  an	  online	  context	  as	  it	  is	  offline.	  For	  example,	  in	  
preparation	  for	  the	  NetMundial	  meeting,	  one	  aggregate	  group	  –	  Best	  Bits,	  coordinated	  a	  planning	  
meeting	  for	  over	  90	  civil	  society	  groups	  that	  would	  have	  input	  into	  the	  dialogue	  and	  process.71	  These	  
groups	  and	  individuals	  represented	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  interests	  but	  many	  of	  them	  fell	  into	  human	  
rights,	  freedom	  of	  information,	  intellectual	  property	  and/or	  privacy	  categories.	  Of	  60	  organisations	  
participating,	  more	  than	  two	  thirds	  were	  from	  the	  West	  or	  Brazil.	  Many	  of	  the	  remainder	  were	  non-­‐
western	  chapters	  of	  Western	  funded	  NGOs.	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  literature	  on	  the	  important	  
role	  that	  civil	  society	  is	  playing	  in	  Chinese	  Internet	  politics	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  oversight	  and	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accountability	  sense	  that	  Scholte	  would	  anticipate,	  there	  is	  little	  representation	  of	  these	  views,	  
values	  or	  approaches	  in	  the	  established	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  dialogue	  about	  civil	  society.	  72	  
These	  problems	  of	  participation	  and	  representation	  have	  led	  to	  suggestions	  that	  we	  are	  witnessing	  
the	  emergence	  of	  a	  “global	  civil	  society	  elite”.73	  Civil	  society	  in	  this	  view	  is	  a	  small	  group	  of	  people	  
who	  feel	  strongly	  enough	  to	  get	  involved	  and	  who	  are	  funded	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  is	  a	  concern	  reflected	  in	  
a	  recent	  Internet	  Society	  poll	  that	  found	  that	  almost	  75%	  of	  respondents	  agree	  or	  strongly	  agree	  
that	  inclusiveness	  is	  an	  area	  requiring	  more	  attention.	  Specifically	  “increased	  participation	  of	  actors	  
from	  developing	  countries”,	  “funding	  solutions	  (especially	  for	  civil	  society	  representatives)”,	  and	  
“focus	  on	  end	  users	  of	  the	  Internet”.74	  Mueller	  has	  observed	  the	  fine	  line	  between	  “the	  openness,	  
diversity,	  and	  informality	  that	  are	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  civil	  society,	  and	  …	  the	  need	  for	  formal	  
mechanisms	  for	  representation	  and	  decision	  making	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  governance	  processes.”75	  This	  
is	  a	  broader	  challenge	  for	  civil	  society	  representation	  in	  global	  governance	  but	  it	  has	  specific	  
implications	  for	  power	  in	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  model.	  
Although	  these	  dominant	  civil	  society	  groups	  do	  not	  always	  promote	  policies	  that	  are	  perfectly	  
aligned	  with	  US	  interests,	  where	  they	  do	  not,	  their	  influence	  is	  so	  minimal	  as	  not	  to	  generate	  any	  
significant	  friction	  for	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  that	  the	  civil	  society	  chose	  to	  
focus	  on	  at	  NetMundial	  was	  network	  neutrality	  –	  a	  complex	  and	  indistinct	  problem	  around	  
managing	  data	  flows.	  Opinions	  on	  this	  issue	  are	  deeply	  divided	  but	  despite	  their	  emphasis	  on	  it,	  civil	  
society	  actors	  at	  NetMundial	  felt	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  make	  any	  headway	  on	  net	  neutrality	  at	  all.76	  	  
Civil	  society	  is	  –	  or	  should	  be,	  important	  to	  global	  Internet	  governance	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  Its	  
capacity	  to	  provide	  oversight	  and	  also	  to	  promote	  the	  interests	  of	  human	  beings	  over	  business	  and	  
governments	  is	  certainly	  desirable.	  However,	  the	  legitimacy	  challenges	  that	  stem	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  
accountability,	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  constituency	  and	  poor	  representation	  limit	  the	  power	  of	  civil	  society	  
in	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  process.	  Perhaps	  of	  most	  concern	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  their	  involvement	  in	  
multi-­‐stakeholderism	  serves	  to	  placate	  calls	  for	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  human	  beings	  
while	  not	  effectively	  curbing	  the	  power	  exercised	  by	  other	  stakeholders.	  	  
Conclusion	  
Laura	  DeNardis	  argues	  that	  the	  decentralized	  and	  diverse	  nature	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  Internet	  
governance	  is	  its	  strength	  and	  indeed,	  she	  regards	  it	  as	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  ‘resilience,	  stability	  and	  
adaptability	  of	  the	  Internet’.	  77	  Certainly	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  model	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this	  specific	  issue	  area	  and	  arguably,	  more	  broadly	  for	  other	  global	  governance	  issues.	  It	  is	  equally	  
important	  however,	  to	  critically	  analyse	  its	  weaknesses	  as	  it	  is	  to	  celebrate	  its	  promise.	  One	  of	  the	  
fundamental	  problems	  with	  the	  current	  arrangements	  is	  that	  rather	  than	  disperse	  power	  to	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  actors,	  multi-­‐stakeholderism	  reinforces	  existing	  power	  dynamics	  that	  have	  been	  ‘baked	  in’	  
to	  the	  model	  from	  the	  beginning.	  It	  privileges	  north-­‐western	  governments	  –	  particularly	  the	  US,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  US	  private	  sector.	  With	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Internet	  users	  still	  to	  come	  online	  residing	  in	  
North	  and	  Southeast	  Asia,	  greater	  respect	  for	  diverse	  voices	  and	  approaches	  to	  Internet	  governance	  
will	  be	  essential	  to	  sustaining	  the	  success	  of	  the	  past	  25	  years.	  
Internet	  governance	  encompasses	  so	  many	  factors	  both	  material	  and	  deeply	  ideational	  that	  debates	  
about	  it	  are	  difficult	  to	  conduct	  with	  clarity.	  It	  forces	  decisions	  and	  approaches	  on	  issues	  that	  are	  
divisive	  in	  the	  extreme	  at	  a	  civil	  society	  level	  as	  well	  as	  an	  elite	  level.	  While	  some	  aspects	  of	  Internet	  
governance	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  technical	  coordination	  that	  present	  low	  barriers	  to	  cooperation,	  there	  
are	  many	  other	  aspects	  that	  have	  political,	  commercial,	  legal	  and	  cultural	  implications.	  
Acknowledging	  the	  deeply	  political	  side	  of	  Internet	  governance	  is	  unavoidable	  and	  so	  is	  recognising	  
that	  governments	  will	  continue	  to	  expect	  to	  promote	  their	  national	  interest	  in	  this	  context.	  A	  much	  
broader	  cross	  section	  of	  private	  sector	  actors	  needs	  to	  be	  empowered	  in	  the	  process	  and	  perhaps	  
most	  crucially;	  a	  role	  for	  civil	  society	  that	  is	  representative	  and	  can	  make	  a	  meaningful	  contribution	  
needs	  to	  be	  developed.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Thomas	  Reiss	  and	  Rorden	  Wilkinson,	  “[e]verything	  is	  
globalized	  –	  that	  is,	  everything	  except	  politics.”78	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